We analyze a closely held corporation characterized by the absence of a resale market for its shares. We show that the founder of the "rm can optimally choose an ownership structure with several large shareholders to force them to form coalitions to obtain control. By grouping member cash #ows, a coalition internalizes to a larger extent the consequences of its actions and hence takes more e$cient actions than would any of its individual members. The model has implications for the optimal bundling of cash #ow and voting rights, and for the optimal number and size of shareholders.
Introduction
The vast majority of "rms in developing and transitional economies do not have their shares traded in an exchange. Even in the U.S., out of almost 4 million corporations that "led taxes in 1993 (Statistics of Income), a mere 7,842 corporations were listed in the NYSE, Nasdaq and Amex combined (1994 Nasdaq Fact Book) .
Closely held corporations typically have an ownership structure comprised of several signi"cant shareholders. However, the corporate "nance literature has focused on "rms with either a dispersed ownership structure (Berle and Means, 1932; Grossman and Hart, 1980) or a single controlling shareholder (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Burkart et al., 1997) . In the former case, shareholders are too small and disorganized to impose their will. As a result, control resides in the hands of the manager. In the latter, the dominant shareholder dictates corporate policy either by managing the "rm directly or by closely monitoring the managing team. Remaining shareholders lack either the power or the incentives to oppose the controlling shareholder's decisions.
In this paper, we focus on "rms in which shareholders are large enough not to surrender control to the manager even though no individual shareholder is large enough to control the "rm alone. In these "rms, corporate policy is the result of interaction among shareholders.
In the model we develop, an initial owner chooses an ownership structure with multiple large shareholders to prevent a single shareholder from taking unilateral actions that might hurt other shareholders. For instance, in the presence of multiple large shareholders, a decision to divert funds from the "rm requires the consent of a coalition of shareholders. Since a coalition of shareholders diverts fewer funds than would any of its individual members, the initial owner can commit to low levels of fund diversion by seeking the participation of other large shareholders. In other words, by diluting her power, the initial owner commits not to undertake unilateral actions.
In our model, a "rm's initial owner, in need of external capital, sells votes and cash #ows to wealth-constrained outside investors. Once the ownership structure is determined, coalitions compete to seize control of the "rm. Shareholders value control because it allows them to enjoy private bene"ts. We assume that these bene"ts come at the expense of noncontrolling shareholders and, moreover, that such bene"ts are ine$cient to extract. The outcome of the control contest is in#uenced by the ownership structure, i.e., by the number of votes and the size of the cash #ows of each shareholder. Therefore, when deciding the ownership structure, the initial owner takes into account both the need to raise funds and the in#uence of the ownership structure on the outcome of the control contest.
Our results about ownership are driven by two opposing e!ects, which we call the alignment and coalition formation e!ects. The alignment e!ect is the positive relation that exists between the cash #ow stake of the controlling coalition and total "rm value. The greater the cash #ow possessed by the controlling coalition, the more this coalition internalizes the costs of its actions. Hence, the fewer costly private bene"ts it extracts. This e!ect is similar to that described in Jensen and Meckling (1976) .
The second and novel e!ect arises from shareholder equilibrium behavior at the time of coalition formation. Once votes and cash #ows are distributed, many di!erent coalitions have su$cient voting power to control the "rm. However, out of these coalitions, the one with the smallest cash #ow stake wins the control contest because it has the largest group of shareholders (in term of cash #ows) from whom to expropriate. This implies that, conditional on having su$cient voting power to control the "rm, the coalition formation e!ect minimizes the cash #ow stake of the winning coalition.
Consider the initial owner's choice between retaining absolute control and diluting control of the "rm. Note that, through the price of the securities sold, the initial owner bears any ine$ciency caused by diversion. If the initial owner has enough wealth to "nance the "rm and retain a large portion of the cash #ows, say 80%, then it is optimal for her to retain absolute control. By doing so, the winning coalition, which in this case will be the initial owner herself, will have a considerable fraction of the cash #ows.
However, if the initial owner's wealth allows her to retain a smaller fraction, say only 55%, then retaining control is not optimal. Consider an alternative ownership structure in which the initial owner sells 33 % of the cash #ows and votes to each of two investors. With this ownership structure, two shareholders will form a coalition to control the "rm. With 66 % of the cash #ows, the controlling body will take more e$cient actions than one with only 55%. Clearly, the initial owner would like the controlling coalition to include all three shareholders (the alignment e!ect). However, once votes and cash #ows are distributed, shareholders have incentives to form a controlling coalition that expropriates the largest set of shareholders (the coalition formation e!ect), and consequently, one shareholder is left out.
Not all ownership structures in which control is diluted generate the same value for the "rm. Indeed, by studying how control can be diluted optimally, our analysis yields a number of results about ownership structure.
First, we de"ne a control structure as the collection of coalitions with su$cient power to control the "rm. We "nd that for any possible control structure, there is a one-share}one-vote ownership structure that maximizes e$ciency. The intuition behind this "nding is that deviations from a one-share}one-vote structure create shareholders with a high ratio of votes to cash #ows. Thus, the coalition formation e!ect tends to include these shareholders in the controlling coalition. As a result, this coalition ends up with a small cash #ow stake, which is a bad outcome in terms of e$ciency.
Following the initial contributions from Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) , an extensive literature on the optimality of oneshare}one-vote has developed. Our "nding di!ers from this literature in that it is not derived in the context of takeovers and applies to closely held corporations.
Second, we establish the relation between e$ciency and the number of shareholders. In particular, we show that the larger the equilibrium number of shareholders, the smaller the value of the "rm. Third, we show that the best ownership structure is one with either a single large shareholder or shareholders of roughly the same size. The intuition for these two results is similar: as cash #ows are distributed among more shareholders, or as they are distributed more unevenly, it will be easier to "nd a coalition with su$cient voting power and a relatively small cash #ow stake. A "nding similar to our third result is obtained by Zwiebel (1995) in a model in which the ownership structure is determined by investors who allocate their wealth across "rms to receive a larger share of the private bene"ts.
This paper is related to a growing literature on the expropriation of minority shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that, in most countries, the relevant agency problem that corporate governance should address is the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders rather than the expropriation of all shareholders by the manager. A number of studies suggest that large shareholders function as a mechanism to mitigate such expropriation. La Porta et al. (1999) and Pagano and Roel (1998) argue that other large shareholders reduce diversion by monitoring the controlling shareholder. Gomes and Novaes (1999) focus on how ex-post bargaining problems among large shareholders protect minority shareholders by preventing large shareholders from undertaking actions that would reduce minority shareholders' payo!s. Gomes and Novaes' analysis and ours are complementary since we focus on the formation process of the controlling coalition without considering ex-post bargaining problems, while they concentrate on bargaining problems and do not consider strategic issues relating to coalition formation. However, the two analyses are similar in that they endogenize the process by which large shareholders mitigate diversion rather than starting with an exogenous monitoring technology. Our paper contributes to this literature by introducing control dilution as a mechanism to reduce diversion.
Interestingly, our result that control dilution is an e!ective mechanism to reduce diversion counters the suggestions in La Porta et al. (1999) and Bebchuk (1999) that argue that, in countries with poor investor protection, control should be concentrated to prevent someone seizing it without fully paying for it. However, this scenario cannot occur in our model since, once the initial owner sells the securities, there is no market for them. In addition, the initial owner is not worried about losing control since she receives full payment for the bene"ts of control that shareholders expect to receive.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. In Section 3, we analyze the coalition formation process. In Section 4, we take the control structure (i.e., the voting distribution) as given and show the optimality of a one-share}one-vote ownership structure. In Section 5, we completely solve for the optimal ownership structure (i.e., the number of shareholders, the control structure, and the cash #ow distribution). Section 6 discusses contracts that specify the composition of the board. In the model, we do not consider these contracts even though they can be shown to improve e$ciency. In this section we argue why our model is still valid and provide rough evidence that coalitions form to expropriate funds from the shareholders that are left out. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
The model
The timing of events is shown in Fig. 1 . At date 0, an entrepreneur has the opportunity of setting up a "rm at a cost K(1. We assume that the entrepreneur's wealth is not su$cient to cover the entire setup cost, so she must obtain outside "nance. We denote the pool of potential investors by N. Each investor has a "nite level of wealth = G , i3N. We order these investors such that = *= *2*= I, . We assign the number 0 to the entrepreneur and denote her initial wealth by = . At this date, the entrepreneur chooses a subset of investors to become shareholders of the "rm and sells a number of votes and cash #ow rights to each. We allow the entrepreneur to sell a di!erent number of votes and cash #ows to any shareholder; that is, we do not impose a oneshare}one-vote ownership structure. The entrepreneur might decide to sell out or stay as a shareholder. The ownership structure is then described by a set of shareholders I, (with I!+0,-N) , a number of votes v G *0, and a fraction of the "rm's cash #ow c G '0, for each shareholder i3I with l Z' c l " l Z' v l "1. We restrict c G '0 to simplify the proofs. Allowing the entrepreneur to set c G "0
will not a!ect the results. We de"ne *"+v G , GZ' and c"+c G , GZ' as the pro"le of votes and cash #ow rights.
We assume that shareholders are not allowed to trade their shares. This assumption captures the closely-held nature of the corporations we are studying. These corporations do not have their shares listed in an exchange. Furthermore, they usually have contracts in place that signi"cantly restrict the transferability of shares. Moreover, absent this restriction, only ownership structures with one signi"cant shareholder would be stable. Thus, by restricting the transferability of shares the entrepreneur can choose from a larger set of ownership structures. However, analyzing the tradeo! between this bene"t and the potential costs of the lack of transferability is beyond the scope of this paper.
At date 1, shareholders meet to elect the board of the "rm. Each shareholder votes for one of the potential boards. We do not restrict shareholders to vote for coalitions to which they belong. In fact, we assume that a shareholder can vote for any coalition C-I. The winning coalition is the one that receives the most votes, with the number of votes that a given coalition receives computed by summing the votes of the shareholders that voted for it. In the case of a tied vote, the coalition supported by the shareholder with the lowest index wins. For instance, if the entrepreneur stays as a shareholder and there is a 50}50 tie, the coalition she supports is the winner. This rule might re#ect the power of the entrepreneur as the founder of the "rm. We apply this tie-breaking assumption merely to simplify the voting game. In practice, however, when there is a tie or a &deadlock' a shareholder can ask a court for &involuntary dissolution' of the corporation or a judge can impose a buyout at a judicially determined price (Hamilton, 1996) .
At date 2, the board diverts d of the revenue and pays out the remaining portion as dividends. We assume that funds are lost when revenue is diverted. The cost of diversion is embodied in the diversion technology B( ) ). For a level of diversion d, the diverted amount received by the board is only B(d), which satis"es
This diversion technology corresponds, in essence, to Jensen and Meckling's (1976) idea of extraction of nonpecuniary bene"ts. The same set of assumptions for the diversion technology can be found in Burkart et al. (1998) . We assume that the diverted amount is distributed among board members in proportion to their cash #ow rights. Shareholders that do not belong to the board receive only what is left of the revenue. Designating the winning coalition as C and the level of diversion chosen by this coalition as d, the date 2 payo! to shareholder i is given by
We adopt this ad-hoc sharing rule to focus on the con#ict between board members and minority shareholders, rather than on the con#ict among board members. With this rule, members of any possible board unanimously agree on the level of diversion (see comments after Lemma 1 below). In addition, other reasonable sharing rules such as dividing the private bene"ts equally among board members or dividing them in proportion to the number of votes do not guarantee existence of equilibrium in the voting game. Finally, we assume that the interest rate is zero and that all agents are risk neutral. The objective of the entrepreneur is to maximize the sum of the amount collected at date 0 from investors and, if she stays as a shareholder, her expected date 2 payo!. The amount investors are willing to pay and the entrepreneur's date 2 payo! depend on the identity of the winning coalition and its subsequent actions. Therefore, in designing the ownership structure, the entrepreneur must consider how this structure will a!ect the control contest and the level of diversion that the winning coalition will carry out. We examine these questions in the next section.
Characterization of the equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the subgame that starts at date 1. We take as given the ownership distribution, that is, the set of shareholders I and the cash #ow and vote pro"les, c and *, respectively. We are interested in two aspects of the equilibrium: the identity of the winning coalition and the amount of diversion that it carries out.
The answer to this last question is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that coalition C is the board and that c is the cash yow proxle. The level of diversion chosen by C, d(C, c), satisxes
B(d(C, c))" l Z! c l .(3)
In addition, d(C, c) is decreasing in the cash yow stake of the winning coalition.
The optimal diversion level for shareholder i is found by maximizing his payo! given in Eq. (2). Eq. (3) is the resulting "rst-order condition (the secondorder conditions for a maximum are satis"ed). Since this "rst-order condition is the same for every board member, they unanimously agree to divert d(C, c). Furthermore, since B( ) )(0, Eq. (3) implies that diversion decreases with the cash #ow stake of the winning coalition.
Lemma 1 is related to the alignment e!ect we discussed in the introduction. Speci"cally, the winning coalition more fully internalizes the consequences of its actions and hence engages in less diversion the greater its cash #ows. Therefore, since diversion is ine$cient, "rm value increases with the cash #ow stake of the board.
Using pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibrium as our solution concept for the voting game leaves us with a large number of equilibria. In fact, when no shareholder has more than 50% of the votes, any coalition can be the winning board. To see this fact, take any coalition and consider the case in which all shareholders vote for that coalition. This is an equilibrium since no shareholder can change the result of the election by unilaterally deviating. To narrow this set of equilibria, we use a cooperative re"nement. In the voting game at date 1, we require that no coalition of shareholders can jointly deviate and thus strictly increase the payo! to each coalition member. That is, we require the equilibrium to be a strong equilibrium in the sense of Aumann (1959) .
Intuitively, the coalition of board members must have su$cient voting power to be elected. In particular, since this coalition expropriates the coalition of non-board members, it must be able to beat this latter coalition at the shareholders' meeting. This motivates the concept of a strong coalition, which proves useful in characterizing the set of equilibria.
De,nition 1. A strong coalition relative to the voting distribution * is a coalition in which either 1. The sum of the votes of its members is strictly larger than 50% or 2. The sum of the votes is exactly 50% and the shareholder with the minimum index is a member.
A weak coalition relative to * is one that is not strong relative to *.
In other words, a strong coalition can impose its will regardless of how the rest of the shareholders vote. In particular, when all the members of a strong coalition vote for a given board, that board is elected.
We de"ne S(*) as the collection of all strong coalitions relative to a voting distribution *. That is,
S(*)"+X-I
: X is strong relative to *,.
The following proposition characterizes the set of equilibria.
Proposition 1. For the subgame that starts at date 1, an equilibrium always exists for any set of shareholders, I, and any cash yow and vote distributions, c and *, respectively. Moreover, in all equilibria, the winning coalition, CH, is a strong coalition with the minimum cash yow of all strong coalitions. That is,
CH3argmin
!Z1
Many coalitions could satisfy Eq. (4). In what follows, we assume that any of these coalitions is equally likely to win.
The "rst part of Proposition 1 guarantees existence of an equilibrium for every possible ownership structure. This guarantee is necessary to have a wellde"ned game. The second part of Proposition 1 is intuitively appealing. The coalition of board members expropriates wealth from the coalition of non-board members. Hence, board members must have su$cient voting power to beat the coalition of non-board members, i.e., the winning board must be strong. Furthermore, the coalition with the smallest cash #ow stake of all the strong coalitions wins. This coalition wins because, of all the strong coalitions, it is the one whose members bene"t the most from fund diversion since they have a`biggera set (in terms of cash #ows) of non-board members from whom to expropriate. This result is what we call the coalition formation e!ect. By selecting the strong coalition with the smallest cash #ow stake, the coalition formation e!ect provides a counterweight to the entrepreneur's objective of maximizing the cash #ow of the winning coalition. This tension drives most of the results in our analysis.
Two intermediate results are needed to prove Proposition 1. We state them as lemmas and then sketch the proof of Proposition 1. Part (i) of Lemma 2 is straightforward: a shareholder prefers expropriating to being expropriated. The explanation for part (ii) is the following. Since a controlling coalition with a smaller cash #ow stake diverts more funds than one with a larger cash #ow stake (Lemma 1), a shareholder gets a larger fraction of the "rm's revenue when he participates in the coalition with the smaller cash #ow stake.
Lemma 2. For a given cash yow distribution, c, the following hold:
The next lemma identi"es properties of strong coalitions. These properties follow directly from the de"nition.
Lemma 3. For a given voting distribution, *, the following hold:
coalition is strong if and only if its complement (the coalition formed by the members that do not belong to it) is weak. (ii) Any two strong coalitions have at least one shareholder in common.
With these two lemmas, we now explain the result of Proposition 1. First, a weak coalition cannot be supported in equilibrium as the winning board. If such a coalition won, non-board shareholders could pro"tably deviate by voting for the coalition formed by themselves. By Lemma 3(i), the deviating coalition is strong, and hence it would be elected as the winning board. In addition, by Lemma 2(i), each of the members of the deviating coalition would be better o! because, as a result of the deviation, they would go from being expropriated to expropriating others.
Second, a strong coalition that does not minimize the sum of cash #ows among the strong coalitions cannot be supported as the winning board. If such a coalition were the winning board, it would be pro"table for the members of any strong coalition with a smaller cash #ow stake to vote for the coalition formed by themselves. Since the deviating coalition is strong, it would win. Moreover, all the members of the deviating coalition would be better o!. First, those who did not belong to the winning board at the proposed equilibrium would become board members. Hence, by Lemma 2(i), they would be better o!. Second, those who did belong to the winning board at the proposed equilibrium would become board members of a board with a smaller cash #ow stake. Thus, by Lemma 2(ii), they too would be better o!.
Finally, there is always at least one equilibrium in which the coalition that minimizes the sum of cash #ows among the strong coalitions, CH, wins. Indeed, if everyone votes for CH, no coalition can pro"tably deviates. A weak coalition does not deviate because it cannot change the results of the election. To see that a strong coalition does not deviate, suppose towards a contradiction that a strong coalition pro"tably deviates. Since deviating shareholders are better o!, the deviation causes a new board to be elected. Note that the new board need not be the same as the deviating coalition. Since any two strong coalitions have at least one shareholders in common (Lemma 3(ii)), then one of the deviating shareholders must be a member of CH. Because this shareholder is better o! deviating, he must be a member of the new board (Lemma 2(i)). Furthermore, according to Lemma 2(ii), this new board must have less cash #ow than CH. Hence, the new board is weak (by de"nition, no strong coalition can have less cash #ow than CH) and diverts more than CH (by Proposition 1). Since the new board is weak, but the deviating coalition is strong, there must be a deviating shareholder not in the new board. Since the new board diverts more than CH, this shareholder cannot be better o!. Therefore, no coalition deviates from the proposed equilibrium.
Proposition 1 can be further simpli"ed by noting that a strong coalition with at least one strong proper subset never wins. The reason is that such a coalition has more cash #ow than its strong proper subset and thus it never has the minimum cash #ow stake among the strong coalitions. Therefore, to "nd a winning coalition, we can restrict attention to strong coalitions with no strong proper subsets. We call these coalitions relevant strong coalitions.
Dexnition 2. A relevant strong coalition relative to a voting distribution * is a strong coalition whose proper subsets are all weak. In addition, a relevant shareholder is one that belongs to at least one relevant strong coalition.
According to this discussion, Eq. (4) can be rewritten as
CH3argmin
!Z0
where R(*) is the collection of all relevant strong coalitions relative to *, or R(*)"+X-I: X is a relevant strong coalition relative to *,.
Relevant strong coalitions are those that compete for control. These coalitions have the minimum number of shareholders necessary to amass su$cient votes to seize control. Members of a relevant strong coalition can obtain control and share the private bene"ts among themselves. Therefore, they have no incentive to add shareholders to their coalition.
An element of the range of R( ) ) is a collection of only those coalitions able to seize control of the "rm. Note that many voting distributions generate the same collection of relevant strong coalitions. Interchanging any two such voting distributions (but keeping the distribution of cash #ows "xed) does not a!ect the identity of the winning coalition, the amount of fund diversion, or the "nal payo! to each shareholder. That is, all the information about the voting distribution is summarized by the collection of relevant strong coalitions it generates. In the following discussion, we refer to each of these collections as a control structure.
Dexnition 3.
A control structure is a collection of all the relevant strong coalitions relative to some voting distribution.
To clarify this term, we provide an example. Consider the voting distribution (0.2, 0.35, 0.45). The collection of strong coalitions relative to this voting distribution is S((0.2, 0.35, 0.45))"++1, 2,, +1, 3,, +2, 3,, +1, 2, 3,,. However, coalition +1, 2, 3, is not relevant strong, because some of its proper subsets are strong coalitions. Hence, the collection of relevant strong coalitions for this voting distribution is R((0.2, 0.35, 0.45))"++1, 2,, +1, 3,, +2, 3,,. Similarly, starting from the voting distribution ( , , ), we "nd that R(( , , )) "++1, 2,, +1, 3,, +2, 3,,. Therefore, we say that the voting distributions ( , , ) and (0.2, 0.35, 0.45) generate the same control structure ++1, 2,, +1, 3,, +2, 3,,.
This section has described the identity of the winning coalition and the amount of funds it diverts as a function of the ownership structure. The following sections are devoted to solving the entrepreneur's problem of choosing the set of shareholders, the control structure, and the cash #ow distribution at date 0. Note that, by the previous discussion, we can think of the entrepreneur's problem at date 0 as choosing a control structure rather than a voting distribution.
The "rst best solution in this model is obtained when the entrepreneur has su$cient wealth to pay for the entire setup cost. In this case, she keeps 100% of the cash #ows and votes, does not divert funds, and receives a payo! of 1 at date 2. Alternatively, if there is an investor with wealth greater than 1, the entrepreneur can sell the entire "rm to him for an amount of 1. In all other cases, the entrepreneur has to consider ownership structures with more than one shareholder. We focus on such cases in the following sections.
We solve the entrepreneur's problem in a number of steps. Although the problem is interesting only in cases in which wealth constraints prevent the entrepreneur from obtaining the "rst best solution, the solution method we follow does not explicitly consider wealth constraints until the last step. In the next section, we take any control structure (with any number of relevant shareholders) as given and "nd the associated cash #ow distribution that maximizes "rm value. In Section 5, we take the number of relevant shareholders as given and "nd both the control structure and its associated cash #ow distribution that maximize "rm value. We then use the results we obtain in these two sections to solve the complete problem with wealth constraints. These preliminary results both lead to the solution and provide insights into the optimal ownership structure.
One-share}one-vote
In this section, we apply Proposition 1 to analyze the optimal bundling of cash #ows and votes. The previous discussion suggests that the entrepreneur's problem can be stated as one of choosing the number of shareholders, the cash #ow distribution, and the control structure. In this section, however, we do not yet consider this complete problem. Rather, we "nd the cash #ow pro"le that maximizes the value of the "rm given a particular control structure.
Because diverting funds is ine$cient, maximizing the value of the "rm is equivalent to minimizing fund diversion. Lemma 1 indicates that this is accomplished by maximizing the cash #ow stake of the board. Since by Proposition 1, the winning coalition is the one with the minimum cash #ow of all relevant strong coalitions, the optimal cash #ow distribution, cH, for a given control structure, R, is the solution to the following problem:
The example, though simple, might appear coincidental because, with three shareholders, there are is a limited number of control structures. We provide two additional examples. First, starting with the control structure R"++2, 3, 4, 5,, +1, 5,, +1, 4,, +1, 3,, +1, 2,,, we obtain (3/7, 1/7, 1/7, 1/7, 1/7) as the optimal cash #ow distribution. It can easily be checked that the voting distribution (3/7, 1/7, 1/7, 1/7, 1/7) in turn generates the control structure R. Another example is the control structure R"++1, 2, 3,, +1, 2, 4,, +1, 3, 4,,+1, 5,, +2, 3, 5,, +2, 4, 5,, +3, 4, 5,, with its corresponding optimal cash #ow distribution (2/7, 1/7, 1/7, 1/7, 2/7), which again generates R.
Given a control structure, the goal is to distribute cash #ows to maximize the cash #ow stake of the relevant strong coalition with the minimum cash #ow.
To illustrate the main result of this section, consider the following example. Take the control structure R"++1, 2,, +1, 3,, +2, 3,,. First, consider the cash #ow distribution (0.2, 0.2, 0.6). The cash #ows of the relevant strong coalitions +1, 2,, +1, 3,, and +2, 3, are 0.4, 0.8, and 0.8, respectively. Therefore, by Proposition 1, coalition +1, 2,, which has 0.4 of the cash #ow, would win. Next, consider the cash #ow distribution ( , , ). All the relevant strong coalitions have cash #ows of . Therefore, each has an equal probability of winning. Clearly, this cash #ow distribution is better than the previous one, which yielded a winning coalition with a cash #ow of only 0.4. Moreover, this cash #ow distribution maximizes "rm value since it solves Eq. (6) for this control structure. In this section, we are interested in the relation between the optimal cash #ow distribution and the voting distributions that generate the control structure, R. In this example, the voting distribution ( , , ) generates the control structure R(( , , ))"++1, 2,, +1, 3,, +2, 3,,. This control structure is the one which with we started. Hence, there exists a one-share}one-vote ownership structure, *H"cH" ( , , ) , that maximizes e$ciency for the given control structure R. Note that this is not the only ownership structure that maximizes e$ciency in this control structure. Nor is it the case that any one-share}one-vote structure is optimal. This example simply suggests that there is one one-share}one-vote ownership structure that maximizes e$ciency. Proposition 2 generalizes this example to any control structure.
Proposition 2. Fix any control structure, R, and let cH be the cash yow distribution that maximizes xrm value for this control structure. The voting distribution, *H"cH, generates R, i.e., R(*H)"R.
This proposition states that, for any control structure, there is a oneshare}one-vote ownership structure, *H"cH, such that cH is the optimal cash #ow distribution for the given control structure, and *H generates the given control structure.
We show in the appendix that the given control structure, R, and the control structure, R(*H), are the same. Here, however, we focus on why the coalitions in R are relevant strong relative to *H. This result follows from the tension between the alignment e!ect, which requires that the winning coalition have the largest possible cash #ow stake, and the coalition formation e!ect, which selects the relevant strong coalition with the smallest cash #ow stake.
First, notice that any one-share}one-vote ownership structure guarantees a winning coalition with more than 50% of the cash #ows. The reason is that the winning coalition must be one of the relevant strong coalitions that, by de"nition, have more than 50% of the votes. Thus, with a one-share}one-vote ownership structure, the winning coalition must have more than 50% of the cash #ows as well. Therefore, the value for the problem in Eq. (6) must be more than 50% because the entrepreneur can always choose a cash #ow distribution equal to one of the voting distributions that generate R. Moreover, since the winning coalition minimizes the cash #ow of all relevant strong coalitions, then all relevant strong coalitions have more cash #ows than the winning coalition, that is, more than 50% of the cash #ow. Therefore, for the voting distribution *H"cH, all coalitions in R have more than 50% of the votes, i.e., all coalitions in R are strong relative to *H.
Second, we show that the coalitions in R are relevant strong relative to *H. We prove that, for the optimal cash #ow distribution, when any shareholder is removed from any of the coalitions in R the sum of cash #ows drops below 50%. This result implies that, for *H"cH, all the coalitions in R have weak proper subsets and hence are relevant strong. To establish this result, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let shareholder i be any member of coalition C3R. There exists a coalition D3R such that C5D"+i,.
This lemma indicates that, for every coalition in R, there is another coalition in R such that these two are`almosta disjoint. This result follows from the fact that the relevant strong coalitions have the minimum number of shareholders that ensures su$cient voting power.
Take any coalition C3R, and any shareholder i3C. Also, take the coalition D3R that satis"es the above lemma. Coalition C!+i, and D are disjoint. Hence the sum of their cash #ows must be less than 100%. Since D is relevant strong, it has more than 50% of the cash #ows at the solution. Consequently, C!+i, must have less than 50% of the cash #ows. Since *H"cH, this implies that C!+i, is weak relative to *H. Since this is true for any i3C, it follows that every proper subset of C is weak.
The intuition for this part is that the desire to get as large a fraction of the private bene"ts creates relevant strong coalitions that are almost disjoint (Lemma 4). This sets an upper bound to the cash #ow that any relevant strong coalition can have at the solution. If one relevant strong coalition is allocated a large fraction of the cash #ow, there will be an almost disjoint relevant strong coalition with a small fraction. But this allocation cannot be the solution, because the coalition with a small cash #ow stake would be the one elected. This upper bound implies that when one shareholder in any of the relevant strong coalitions is removed, the cash #ow stake drops below 50%.
As mentioned, Proposition 2 di!ers from the previous literature on the optimal bundling of cash #ow and votes in that our result is not derived in the context of takeovers. Nevertheless, the intuition is similar. Equilibrium behavior at the time of coalition formation brings stakes together in a similar way that share buying by the parties competing for control did in the previous literature.
Ownership structure: the number and size of shareholders
In the last section, we discussed the properties of the best cash #ow distribution for a given control structure. In this section, we investigate the entrepreneur's complete problem of choosing, at date 0, the set of shareholders, the control structure, and the cash #ow distribution.
In principle, to solve the entrepreneur's complete problem, we need to consider every possible number of shareholders and, for a given number, all possible control structures. For each of these cases, we need to solve a problem similar to that in Eq. (6) but adding the investor's wealth constraints. To simplify this procedure, we state Proposition 3. Note that in this proposition, we do not consider wealth constraints yet. Rather we "x the number of relevant shareholders and "nd the control structure and cash #ow distribution that maximize the value of the "rm.
Proposition 3. Suppose the number of relevant shareholders is I.
In the ownership structure that maximizes the value of the xrm, there are no nonrelevant shareholders, the I relevant shareholders receive (c, *), and the cash yow stake the winning coalition is , where E If I"1, c"*"1 and "1.
, where the shareholder that has 2 '> of the votes and cash yows can be anyone.
Note that, according to the de"nition of a strong coalition, I"2 is not a possibility. Also, to lighten notation, rather than providing the optimal control structure, we provide one of the voting distributions generating such a control structure.
Small shareholders decrease e$ciency because they tend to be included in the winning coalition but contribute little cash #ow to it. To maximize the size of the smallest shareholder, cash #ow is spread evenly. The di!erence between the odd and even cases is due to the tie-breaking rule. However, the result and the intuition for both cases are similar.
Some comments relating to Proposition 3 are in order. First, as the number of relevant shareholders increases, e$ciency is reduced. As cash #ows and votes are distributed among more people, it is easier for a coalition with just enough votes and cash #ows to form and be elected. Indeed, this may be one explanation for the fact that closely held corporations tend to have just a few shareholders.
Second, a "rm's ownership structure contain either one large shareholder or many shareholders of roughly equal size. Similar results can be found in both Zwiebel (1995) and Burkart et al. (1997) .
Third, by Proposition 2, we know that, for a given control structure, there is a one-share}one-vote ownership structure that maximizes e$ciency. However, it is not the case that any one-share}one-vote ownership structure is optimal. Nevertheless, the e$ciency loss of using any one-share}one-vote structure instead of the optimal structure goes to zero as the number of relevant shareholders increases. Recall that any one-share}one-vote ownership distribution produces a winning coalition with more than 50% of the cash #ow. But by Proposition 3, the cash #ow of the winning coalition goes to 50% as the number of relevant shareholders increases. This result parallels those found for the optimality of a one-share}one-vote structure when ownership is dispersed. However, we are interested in cases with a small number of shareholders. In these cases, the e$ciency loss of using any one-share}one-vote ownership structure could be signi"cant.
Finally, with Proposition 3, the entrepreneur's complete problem is now easily solved. Proposition 3 takes the number of relevant shareholders as given and assumes that shareholders have enough wealth to buy the fractions of cash #ow and votes assigned to them. However, in the complete problem the entrepreneur must consider wealth constraints. Nevertheless the value of from Proposition 3 is the maximum the entrepreneur can get when wealth constraints are introduced. This is because the introduction of constraints cannot increase the value of a maximization problem. We use this result below.
To simplify notation, we solve the entrepreneur's problem for a particular diversion technology
Qualitatively, the results are similar for any B( ) ) satisfying the assumptions in (1). Furthermore, we assume that the entrepreneur does not retain any cash #ow or votes. We focus on the case in which the investment required K)
. The case in which K' is less interesting, since the value created by the "rm is not high enough to support more than one signi"cant shareholder.
In this example, the entrepreneur's choice of ownership structure is given by:
1. If = * , the best ownership structure is one in which shareholder 1 has complete control (i.e., more than 50% of the votes) and as large a cash #ow stake as he can a!ord. The rest of the cash #ow and votes are sold to other investors; however, neither the number of investors nor their size matters. 2. If = , = , and = belong to the interval [ , ), the optimal ownership structure is one in which each shareholder receives of both votes and cash
#ow.
This mapping from (= , 2 , = , ) to the optimal ownership structure could be extended; however, the two cases above are su$cient to illustrate the main points.
If the wealthiest investor has wealth = *1, then the "rst best solution is obtained by selling the entire "rm to this investor. However, if "rst best solution cannot be achieved, the entrepreneur should not necessarily sell the "rm to more than one relevant shareholder. Actually, by Proposition 3, we know that the best the entrepreneur can do with three (or more) relevant shareholders is to have a winning coalition with two-thirds of the cash #ows. Hence, as long as there is one investor with enough wealth to buy more than two-thirds of the cash #ows, the ownership structure that gives this investor absolute control is optimal.
To calculate the necessary wealth level to buy absolute control and two-thirds of the cash #ows, notice that the diversion technology implies an equilibrium diversion level of dH"1!c, where c is the cash #ow of the winning coalition. The dominant shareholder elects himself to the board and receives the entire private bene"t. Hence, the wealth needed is given by
When none of the potential shareholders has su$cient wealth to buy at least two-thirds of the cash #ow, then an ownership structure with one relevant shareholder is not optimal. By Proposition 3, we know that the more relevant shareholders there are, the larger the e$ciency loss. Hence, the natural step for the entrepreneur is to consider ownership structures with three relevant shareholders. Also, by Proposition 3, we know that the best ownership structure with three relevant shareholders is one in which both votes and cash #ows are distributed equally among shareholders, that is *"c"( , , ). With this ownership structure, any coalition of two shareholders can become the winning board. Hence, a shareholder is in the board with probability , and when in the board, receives half the private bene"ts. All potential winning boards have cash #ows of , implying that dH"1! " . At date 0, each of the future shareholders pays for the cash #ow and private bene"ts he expects to receive:
We make a few comments regarding this example. First, when = is in the interval [ , 1), the optimal ownership structure has one relevant and fairly large
It can be shown that this is the case when = is in the interval [2!K!(2!2K, ) (this interval is not empty because K( ), and = , = , and = belong to [ , ) .
shareholder and (potentially many) nonrelevant minority shareholders. Note that this ownership structure is not one of those prescribed in Proposition 3, because wealth constraints force the entrepreneur to deviate from an ownership with 100% of both votes and cash #ows. That is, when wealth constraints are introduced, the resulting ownership structures are not necessarily those prescribed in Proposition 3. Nevertheless, this proposition speci"es upper bounds that help reaching a solution. Second, the entrepreneur chooses an ownership structure with three relevant shareholders, even when having one relevant shareholder and many nonrelevant shareholders is feasible. That is, our argument is not that the entrepreneur should add more relevant shareholders when wealth constraints prevent him from having only one relevant shareholder. Instead, the entrepreneur switches to three shareholders for e$ciency reasons. By distributing power among three shareholders so that no individual shareholder has absolute power, the entrepreneur forces shareholders to form a coalition to obtain control.
Finally, an ownership structure with equal-sized investors is not a consequence of equal wealth. Rather, it is the best way to avoid having small shareholders who contribute little cash #ow to the winning coalition.
Discussion
In our model, the winning coalition is elected by a speci"c voting game and, once elected, can take any action. We have not considered mechanisms that alter the voting game or restrict the actions that the board can take. For instance, the corporate charter (or a shareholder agreement) may provide minority shareholders with veto rights on certain important policy issues, it may state that the board must be elected using a cumulative voting rule guaranteeing a place on the board for minority owners, or it may explicitly include the composition of the board.
Such initiatives improve e$ciency in our model. Indeed, the "rst best solution can be obtained by contractually requiring all shareholders to have a place on the board. In such circumstances, our analysis remains valid for at least two reasons.
First, if a contract gives every shareholder a seat on the board or veto power over all decisions, a coalition of shareholders would have incentives to invalidate such a contract. One way to invalidate this contract is to argue in court that it alters the statutory scheme (the system speci"ed by law according to which corporations should be governed). Although U.S. courts now uphold a variety of contracts that alter the governance system in closely held corporations, this has not always been the case. In fact, as Hamilton (1996) puts it:`Cases such as these, whether or not correctly decided, illustrate the pervasive impact of the statutory scheme on judicial thought and the danger of assuming that simply because all parties in interest agree to a variation in the statutory scheme, the variation is valida (p. 195, emphasis added). In our model, even a small probability that the agreement among shareholders will be invalidated and that the board will be determined by an election is enough to render our analysis valid.
Second, even if it is feasible to give all shareholders a seat on the board, this alternative can be costly for reasons we do not model in this paper. In general, there is a trade-o! between managerial #exibility and the degree of protection a!orded to minority shareholders. If the corporate charter (or shareholder agreement) does not protect minority shareholders, they are vulnerable to ine$cient exploitation. On the other hand, too strong a protection, may signi"-cantly restrict the controlling coalition's ability to govern the "rm, and may also raise the probability of costly deadlocks among owners. Indeed, this trade-o! is discussed in the legal literature on closely held corporations. For instance, Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) notice that:`Drafters of the organizing documents of a closely held corporation cannot avoid a trade-o!. On the one hand, they must provide some protection to minority investors to ensure that they receive an adequate return on the minority shareholder's investment if the venture succeeds. On the other hand, they cannot give the minority too many rights, for the minority might exercise their rights in opportunistic fashion to divert returns.a (p. 238) Finally, court cases and discussions in corporate law books indicate that the situation in which only a subset of shareholders obtain control and expropriate those who are left out is common.
An example of a court case discussing coalition formation and expropriation is the Levy versus Markal Sales Corporation, 1994 case. Markal Sales Corporation was founded in 1960 by Levy. Some years later, the corporation's ownership structure consisted of three shareholders: Levy with 40% of the stock, Gust with another 40%, and Bakal with the remaining 20% (there were no deviations from one-share}one-vote). In 1980, Gust and Bakal voted to "re Levy as an employer of the corporation and e!ectively excluded him from management. However, Levy kept his shares. Soon after, Markal was o!ered the opportunity to be a sales representative for Apple Computers. However, instead of o!ering the opportunity to Markal Sales Corporation, Gust and Bakal formed their own corporation, G/B Marketing, to represent Apple. Clearly, by doing so, Gust and Bakal diverted resources from Markal by taking a project that belonged to the corporation. After establishing G/B Marketing, Gust and Bakal diverted additional resources from Markal: several G/B salespeople were on Markal payroll, expenses for business trips related to G/B were charged to Markal, and G/B rented o$ce space from Markal at a price signi"cantly below market value.
On a more general level, O'Neal (1987) , in his discussion of shareholder disputes in closely held corporations, observes`The most frequently occurring con#ict of interest is between active shareholders, i.e. shareholder-o$cers or employees, and shareholders who are not active in the businessa (p. 122). Furthermore, he explicitly acknowledges the role of a power contest and the di$culties in enforcing contracts among shareholders:
Holders of a majority of the voting shares in a corporation, through their ability to elect and control a majority of the directors and to determine the outcome of shareholders' votes on other matters, have tremendous power to bene"t themselves at the expense of minority shareholders . . . . Traditionally, American courts have been reluctant to interfere in the internal a!airs of corporations, even when minority shareholders claim they are being squeezed out or otherwise oppressed . . . Furthermore, many courts apparently feel that there is a legitimate sphere in which controlling shareholders can act in their own interest even if the minority su!ers (p. 125)
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze a model of a closely held corporation with nontransferable shares and potentially more than one signi"cant shareholder. In our model the ownership structure determines which group of owners seizes control over the "rm. The model shows that it may be in the initial owner's interest to dilute her own power by distributing votes among several large shareholders. This dilution of power commits the initial owner to form a coalition to obtain control, and thus creates a controlling body that has more cash #ow, and that diverts less. In other words, we propose dilution of power as a mechanism to commit to low levels of diversion. In addition, when we consider the optimal way to dilute control, we obtain several implications for the ownership structure of the "rm.
The model suggest interesting topics about closely held corporations for future research. As discussed in the last section, among these topics is the design of the optimal corporate governance mechanism in the presence of many active shareholders.
The analysis of this paper can also be extended to study the decision by "rms to go public. It can be shown that, in this setting, letting the shareholders freely trade shares will render an ownership structure with many signi"cant owners unstable. Therefore, "rms that go public forgo a mechanism to mitigate diversion. This is a cost that "rms must weigh against the potential bene"ts of going public.
It is possible that, at the proposed equilibrium, some of the members of CA are already voting for coalition CA so, in fact, they do not deviate. However, it is impossible that all the members of CA are voting for CA at the proposed equilibrium, because if this were the case, the winning coalition would be CA and not C. To simplify exposition, we say that the`members of CA deviatea, but it should be understood that only those who are not already voting for CA deviate.
We have used the following fact: for any *, F3S(*)N G-F, with G3R(*). We prove this result by induction on the number of elements of F. Suppose F3S(*) and CF"1, then F3R(*) because the only proper subset of F is , which is weak. Suppose that the statement holds for CF"n and consider the case in which F3S(*) and CF"n#1. If ∀j3F, F!+ j, , S(*), then clearly all proper subsets of F are weak. Therefore, F3R(*).
Suppose that tb is the index of the tie-breaker. Consider the perturbed voting vector vN R@ "v R@ # and vN l "v l # /(I!1) for l3I!+tb,. It can be shown that, for a su$ciently small , the desired result holds.
Proof of Lemma 4. Take any control structure R, any C3R and any i3C. Also take * such that R(*)"R. Since C3R(*), then C!+i, , S(*) (recall that relevant strong coalitions are strong coalitions with weak proper subsets). Thus, (C!+i,)A"CA6+i,3S(*). Therefore, there must be D-CA6+i, such that D3R(*). By construction, D!+i, therefore, C5(D!+i, ) ". Now, since C3S(*) and D3S(*) then C5DO (by Lemma 3(ii)). Finally, C5(D!+i,)" and C5DO imply that C5D"+i,.
Proof of Proposition 2. Take a control structure R. Let cH(R) be the solution to the maximization problem in Eq. (6), which we rewrite here
We denote the value of this maximization problem by (R). For most of this appendix, we will suppress the dependence of cH and on R. The objective of the proof is to show that for *H"cH, R(*H)"R.
Step 1: For any coalition C3R, l Z! cH l ' . Note that, at the solution to (6), all relevant strong coalitions have cash #ows greater than or equal to . Thus, to prove this step, it is enough to show that '
. Take any voting distribution * such that R(* )"R. We must have one of two cases: (a) all C3R(* ) are such that l Z! v l ' or (b) there is at least one C3R(* ) such that l Z! v l " with the tie-breaker belonging to C. In case (a), consider the cash #ow distribution c "* . In this case, for any C3R(* ), l Z! c l " l Z! v l ' . Therefore,
The "rst inequality follows because c is not necessarily the solution to (6). In case (b), it is easy to check that * can be perturbed to obtain *N such that R(*N)"R and that all C3R(*N) are such that l Z! vN l ' . Hence, we can apply the argument of the previous paragraph to *N.
Step 2: For any coalition C3R and any proper subset DLC, l Z"shareholder, then there is C3R such that i 3C. By Lemma 4, there is D3R such that C5D"+i ,. Now,
The "rst inequality uses the fact that, since C 5 D"+i ,, then C!+i ,, D!+i ,, and +i , are pairwise disjoint sets. The last inequality follows because C3R and D3R and, at the solution, all relevant strong coalitions have cash #ows greater than or equal to . Therefore,
The result follows from the above equation and the fact that cH G )1/I (recall cH G is the minimum of I positive terms that add up to 1).
Step 3: For I*3 and I odd, c"*"(1/I, 2 , 1/I) with corresponding " #1/2I. It is easy to check that, for the ownership structure above, " #1/2I. Therefore, by step 2, this structure is optimal.
Step 4: For any control structure R with I even relevant shareholders, (R)) #1/2(I#1). Take any R with I even relevant shareholders and let p( ) ) be the permutation that orders cH(R) as follows
We "rst show that 
, (A.16) where the "rst inequality follows from Eq. (A.10). In case (2), note that 1"
Hence, cH N (1/(I#1), and therefore,
, (A.18) where the "rst inequality follows from Eq. (A.8).
Step 5: For I*3 and even, c"*"(1/(I#1), 2 , 2/(I#1), 2 , 1/(I#1)) (every shareholder has cash #ow and votes 1/(I#1) except one * who can be anyone * who has 2/(I#1)), with corresponding " #1/2(I#1). It is easy to show that, for the above ownership structure, " #1/2(I#1). Therefore, by step 4, this ownership structure is optimal.
